Interlocutory Appeal of Preindictment Suppression Motions Under Rule 41(e)
Under rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1 a defendant may move to block the government's use of illegally seized evidence. 2 Rule 41(e) motions request both the return of the seized property and the prohibition of its use as evidence at trial. 3 While rule 41(e) grants the federal district courts the authority to hear these motions in the first instance, 4 whether a movant may immediately appeal these rulings is less clear.
One such area of uncertainty surrounds the immediate appealability of a ruling on a 41(e) motion in a case where seized evidence has been presented to a grand jury, but where no formal criminal proceeding is pending against the movant at the time the motion is denied. 5 1. Rule 41(e) reads, in pertinent part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
2. One district court has recently denied that it has jurisdiction to hear preindictment motions under rule 41(e). United States v. Mid-States Exchange, 620 F. Supp. 358, 359 (D.S.D. 1985) (holding that the court "simply does not have the power to suppress or return evidence which is the subject of a current grand jury investigation"). Such a ruling, however, ignores the Supreme Court's language in Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 355, which allows district courts to hear preindictment evidentiary motions while evidence is in the possession of a United States Commissioner. MidStates' holding is also highly questionable in light of Eighth Circuit precedent. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1983), the court explicitly decided the issue of the appealability of preindictment 41(e) motions without even questioning the district court's jurisdiction to hear the original motion. See also notes 6-7 infra (cases from other circuits making the same implicit recognition).
5. This Note, therefore, does not address the appealability of 41(e) motions made prior to the empaneling of a grand jury.
1755 [Vol. 84:1755 Six federal courts of appeals refuse to hear such appeals, arguing that the force of precedent and policy precludes interlocutory review of preindictment orders concerning 41(e) motions. 6 On the other hand, four circuits allow immediate appeals in these cases. 7 This Note argues that preindictment rulings denying 8 41(e) motions are not immediately appealable. Part I discusses decisions that mandate dismissal of such appeals for want of jurisdiction. Part II examines the policy rationales behind these precedents. Finally, Part III argues that an adequate remedy exists outside of rule 41(e), rendering immediate appellate review of rulings on 41(e) motions unnecessary.
I. IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF 41(E) MOTION RULINGS AND THE FINAL DECISION RULE
Compliance with the final decision rule 9 is a prerequisite to almost 6 . In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berry) 8. This Note concerns only appeals by movants whose 41(e) motions were denied. The fed· eral statute that specifies when the government can appeal district court orders in criminal cases explicitly allows the government to appeal orders granting 41(e) motions. This provision provides:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. 18 u.s.c. § 3731 (1982).
It is not unfair for courts to allow immediate government appeals of 41(e) motions that arc granted, while refusing to hear such appeals by unsuccessful movants. The reasons for permitting the government to appeal a 41(e) motion that is granted do not apply to the situation in which a 4l(e) motion is denied. Specifically, the quoted section of § 3731 was designed to alleviate the harmful effects on the practice and development of the law of suppression growing out of the absence of a Government appeal. These evils include inconsistent rulings at the trial level; the development of the law of suppression rulings, which Congress rightly viewed as a rapidly changing area, at the District Court level, without the benefit of appellate review; and the dilemma of the prosecutor in choosing whether to follow what he believes to be an unwise limitation on the prosecution or defying it in the hope of convincing a second judge that the first was in error. United States v. Greely, 413 F.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Since a convicted criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to appeal a district court suppression decision, these policies favoring immediate appeals by the government are inapplicable.
9. This rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), reads: "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, .
•. except where a direct review all federal appellate jurisdiction. 10 This rule requires that courts of appeals dismiss for want of jurisdiction any appeal of a district court ruling that is not a "final decision." 11 In addition to the irreparable harm exception, the Supreme Court recognizes an exception to the final decision rule for district court orders which settle issues completely collateral to the case's primary concern. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (exempting from the final decision rule orders which "fall into that small class which finally determine claims of right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated"). Courts have not enlarged this "small class." For example, a person cannot appeal an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum. After all, it is argued, the person so ordered retains the option ofrefusing to produce the evidence and appealing the judge's contempt citation. Given the availability of this mechanism, the district court's decision cannot be considered to determine conclusively the matter. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) . Thus, the collateral order exception remains quite limited in scope.
The 4l(e) motion does not fit into this limited category of cases. This motion relates directly to the guilt or innocence of the movant since it contests the admissibility of the proof that the government will use in its attempt to get a conviction. 15. DiBel/a, 369 U.S. at 121-23. The order of these events is quite important. WhileDiBel/a resolved the cases with this sequence of events, this Note addresses the situation where not only the arguments on the motion, but also the court's decision on the motion and the appeal of that decision, occur before the grand jury indictment.
16. In DiBe//a, the Court decided not only the case at hand, but also stated more broadly when appeals would lie from district court rulings on preindictment evidentiary motions:
When at the time of ruling there is outstanding a complaint, or a detention or release on bail following arrest, or an arraignment, information, or indictment -in each such case the order on a suppression motion must be treated as "but a step in the criminal case prelimi· nary to the trial thereof." . . . Only if the motion is solely for the return of property and is in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the proceedings be regarded as independent. 369 U.S. at 131-32.
17. The same conclusion has been reached where the indictment followed the district court order, but preceded the filing of briefs with the court of appeals. See In re Search Warrants (Trupiano), 750 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984).
18. See note 17 supra. 19. 369 U.S. at 132.
August 1986] the absence of an indictment against the movant should not change the outcome of either element.
A. Motions Solely for the Return of Proper!)'
A movant under rule 4l(e) must request both suppression and return of seized evidence. 20 It is not possible to move "solely" to retrieve property under 41(e). 21 Thus, the "solely for the return of property" test 22 should always preclude interlocutory appeal of any 41(e) motion. 23 · In order to avoid this automatic bar against interlocutory appeal of 41(e) rulings, some courts find that the "solely for the return of property" test is met if the "primary purpose" of the motion is to regain the seized property. 24 However, to read a primary purpose test into DiBella distorts the plain language of the opinion. Even if one strains to interpret the DiBella test this way, a primary purpose test should not allow interlocutory appeal of preindictment 41(e) rulings. A movant's claim that the primary purpose of her 41(e) motion is retrieval is, at the least, suspect. 25 Equitable motions exist that seek only the return of evidence and not its suppression. 26 Any movant whose true 23. That the drafters of rule 41(e) desired such a result can be inferred from their decision, in altering the rule in 1972 (after the DiBel/a decision), to continue its automatic suppression feature. The drafters were certainly aware of the "solely for the return of property" language in DiBella, yet they chose not to allow 41(e) motions to be made simply for the retrieval of property. One can infer that by doing so they intended that no 41(e) motion be the subject of interlocutory appeal.
24 The Eighth Circuit's argument, however, is unconvincing. The Carroll footnote does not consider all of the factors that the Court deemed important in DiBel/a, which was decided five years after Carroll Indeed, the Court's discussion in Carroll did not relate to DiBel/a's first test at all, as seen in its suggestion in the same footnote that a court should consider "the 'essential character and the circumstances under which it is made' [in order to] determine whether a motion is an independent proceeding or merely a step in the criminal case. [Vol. 84:1755 sion motions can "vitally affect" the outcome of a criminal case, 43 a 41(e) motion is not fully independent of the criminal prosecution. 44 Thus, a broad reading of DiBe/la, consistent with its dicta, properly prohibits interlocutory appeals of preindictment 41(e) motions. 45 
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Refusing to allow interlocutory appeals of 41(e) rulings best serves the policy objectives underlying the grand jury system, the final decision rule, and rule 41(e). Allowing such appeals, on the other hand, would impose burdensome and unnecessary costs on the criminal justice system. DiBel/a, however, makes clear that, for the purposes of determining the availability of interlocutory appeal, the independence of a hearing from a "criminal prosecution in esse" does not depend on the attachment of the right to counsel. The Court specifically stated that "the mere circumstance of a pre-indictment motion does not transmute the ensuing evidentiary ruling into an independent proceeding begetting finality even for purposes of appealability." DiBe/la, 369 U.S. at 131. Thus, the "mere circumstance" of the failure of the defendant's sixth amendment right to attach cannot be enough to make the ruling independent for the purposes of interlocutory appeal, and the sixth amendment test cannot be the one the court intended to be used. 
A. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 41(e) Motions on the Grand Jury Process
Allowing a movant to appeal a 41(e) ruling in the midst of a grand jury investigation would adversely affect the grand jury process as a whole. While rule 4l(e) allows some delay by requiring a court to hold an initial hearing on the motion, permitting an immediate and lengthy appeal of the court's ruling would interfere with the grand jury system to an unwarranted degree. 46 Allowing interlocutory appeal gives defense attorneys too much opportunity to stall criminal proceedings. 47 The Supreme Court has noted several reasons why courts must scrupulously avoid delay of grand jury proceedings. 48 First, delay hampers a grand jury's ability to fulfill its goal of fully investigating those people it suspects of criminal activity. 49 Second, because the grand jury plays such a critical role in the criminal justice system, the Court has noted that safeguarding a grand jury's investigation against delay is just as important as protecting the progress of a trial from undue interruption. 50 Indeed, the Court has linked freedom from delay at the grand jury stage of a criminal prosecution with the constitutional right to a speedy trial. 51 Finally, delay decreases the government's ability to gain an indictment and conviction, because it jeopardizes the availability of necessary evidence. 52 Furthermore, the benefits of allowing immediate appeal of 41 ( e) motions do not outweigh these high costs. Of course, the right to appeal denials of -41 ( e) motions could protect some defendants against the burden of standing trial, since suppression could lead to dismissal by the court or a prosecution decision not to proceed with the case. 53 However [Vol. 84:1755 presents to the grand jury system. 55 The Court indicated that facilitating speedy grand jury proceedings was important enough to allow grand juries to issue indictments on the basis of illegally seized evidence. 56 The Court decided that a criminal defendant's opportunity to object to the admission of illegally seized evidence at trial is sufficient to vindicate the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 57 Thus, because a 41(e) movant has a right to raise the suppression issue again at trial, there is no need to allow interlocutory appeal of a preindictment 41(e) ruling.
B. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 41 (e) Motions on the Policies Underlying the Final Decision Rule
According to the Supreme Court, Congress enacted the final decision rule to promote and maintain a speedy and efficient judicial system. 58 The guarantees of the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure give special importance to these policies in criminal cases. 59 In DiBel/a, the Court held that allowing interlocutory appeal of a postindictment ruling on a 41(e) motion would interfere with the smooth and efficient running of the criminal justice system. 60 The same reasoning applies when a motion is denied before a grand jury returns an indictment against the movant. The policy is also reflected in rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that the rules are to "be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(a) (preference to criminal cases on district court dockets); FED. R. APP. P. 45(b) (preference to criminal cases on court of appeals dockets). In fact, efficiency is such an important goal in criminal justice that district court orders denying motions to dismiss on the basis of breach of the defendant's right to a speedy trial cannot be reviewed until after conviction. See MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857 (such an order "obviously is not final").
60. DiBella, 369 U.S. at 129.
Interlocutory appeal fosters inefficiency in three ways. First, as noted above, it causes unnecessary delay. 61 Second, whether a court denies the 41(e) motion before or after indictment, allowing immediate appeal encourages piecemeal review. 62 An appellate court is more likely to issue an incorrect decision on an interlocutory appeal, since the abbreviated record will not yet contain all the facts of the case. 63 Allowing appeal only after trial avoids this problem, thereby fostering efficiency. 64 Finally, the authority of the district court to reconsider the suppression issue at trial exacerbates the inefficiency of allowing interlocutory appeal. All movants whose pretrial 41(e) motions fail have the right to raise the suppression issue again at trial. 65 Thus, the judge closest to the case gets another chance to examine the legality of the seizure of the challenged evidence. With more facts available, the judge could change her earlier decision and agree to suppress the evidence. 66 This "second chance" removes the required finality from the district court's first decision, making interlocutory appeal impermissible. 6 7
C. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 4J(e) Motions upon the Policies Underlying Rule 41 (e)
Because rule 41 ( e) codifies the protections of the exclusionary rule, 68 the same policy goals motivate both rules. Court intended the exclusionary rule to effectuate the protections of the fourth amendment. 70 Neither the exclusionary rule nor rule 41(e) was intended to compensate a victim of an illegal search or seizure for any injury she sustained. 71 Instead, the goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 72 fourth amendment. FED. R. CRIM 222-23 (1960) , the Court, after discussing deterrence, also mentioned that if judicial integrity were to be maintained, convictions could not be obtained using the fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures. In Mapp, the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule guarantees the "judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." 367 U.S. at 660.
The shift in focus away from judicial integrity began in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (relying solely on the deterrence rationale in holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable at grand jury hearings), and continued in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) , where the Court stated that the judicial integrity justification for the exclusionary rule had only a "limited role" to play. Thus, the Court concluded, "[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule .
•. is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights." 428 U.S. at 486. This is now the view of a majority of the Court. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (mentioning only deterrence as a basis for the rule and failing to discuss the impact of the newly created "reasonable mistake" exception on judicial integrity).
In his dissents to both Calandra and Leon, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, has sharply objected to the majority's conclusion regarding the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the majority's position represents a "startling misconception" of the purposes of the exclusionary rule); Leo11, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected."). Given this objective, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply at the grand jury stage of criminal proceedings. 73 The Court rejected the claim that suppression at the pretrial phase of a case is an effective deterrent to police misconduct. 74 Like the Court's refusal to suppress illegally obtained evidence under the exqlusionary rule prior to indictment, 75 denying immediate review of preindictment rulings on 41(e) motions is consistent with the deterrence policy underlying both suppression mechanisms. The protection afforded a criminal defendant by allowing her to raise the suppression issue again at trial sufficiently safeguards her constitutional rights. 76 Furthermore, if a movant is subsequently convicted, she has the right to appeal the trial court's decision to admit challenged evidence. 77 76. As noted above, denying immediate appellate review of 41(e) motions will force some defendants to stand trial on charges based on illegally seized evidence. This problem is not solved if the district court reverses its earlier evidentiary ruling at trial. In Calandra, the Supreme Court held that the danger of delay to the grand jury system outweighs any harm caused by forcing these defendants to stand trial. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
Of course, even if they are eventually acquitted, some defendants may claim they were hurt by the grand jury's mere holding of the evidence. For example, the evidence could be required for business purposes. However, it is possible for this class of movant to make a separate motion that simply asks for return of the evidence, not its suppression. Therefore, any harm caused by the mere holding of the evidence can be attributed to the defendant's own failure to make the correct motion. See Parrish v. United States, 376 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1967) (Boreman, J., concurring) (DiBe//a suggests to movants that they use these equitable motions). For further discussion on these equitable return motions, see notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text.
The argument of these movants, however, is quite compelling in cases where the delay in the Indeed, where no grand jury has been empaneled, immediate appeal is available, since there is no longer anything from which to suppress the evidence. In addition, since there is no grand jury, no criminal investigation has begun, and hence the 4l(e) motion is a wholly independent proceeding. See Angel-Torres, 712 F.2d at 719; see also Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) (an actual or potential criminal case against the movant is all that is needed to deny interlocutory appeal). Standard Drywall also points out that if a grand jury adjourns without returning an indictment, a 41(e) motion by the defendant would be an independent proceeding. 668 F.2d at 158.
Where a grand jury is currently sitting, delay is less of a concern, since it is limited, at most, 
III. EQUITABLE RETURN MOTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES TO 41(E)

MOTIONS
When the Supreme Court decided DiBe/la, it stated that appeals of preindictment evidentiary rulings should never be allowed where the motion was not made solely for the return of the property seized. 1s As Part I of this Note demonstrates, this sole-motive test may be impossible to meet in the context of 4l{e) motions, because 41(e) motions necessarily request both suppression and return of the seized evidence. 79 However, a defendant may make a different motion, similar to that authorized by rule 41(e), that does satisfy the first part of DiBella,s test. so These alternative equitable motions request only the return, st not the suppression, 82 of evidence. Under such a motion, a court may order the government to return evidence to the movant, and still allow the grand jury to keep copies of the evidence or to reexamine the original evidence at a later time. 83 Because these equitable return motions seek only to retrieve evidence, not to determine its admissibility at trial, the legality of the seizure in question is not at issue in these proceedings. 84 Instead, a court will deny an equitable return motion and permit the grand jury to hold the evidence only if the government's need to hold the evidence outweighs the movant's interest in retrieving it. 85 . 1978) . The critical inquiry, from the court's perspective, is the government's justification for holding the material. As the length of time that the government holds the evidence increases, the harm to the movant also increases and the balance tips more heavily in favor of the movant. Also to be considered are the movant's interest in and need for the evidence, whether he would suffer irreparable harm if it were not returned, and the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Movants can argue that 4l(e) motions are not adequate remedies, since they require a showing of illegal seizure of evidence and since they are not immediately appealable. A consideration favoring the government is the goal of allowing the grand jury system to proceed unfettered. In addition, the government's right to conduct criminal investigations with some degree of secrecy is threatened if it must return evidence. See Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1st Cir. 1975).
equitable return motions provide an adequate remedy for those who are injured by the grand jury's detention of their seized property. For such persons, the equitable motion provides a clear path to retrieve their property and allows them to choose a course which permits immediate appellate review.
In addition, because it is collateral to the issue of the movant's guilt or innocence, 86 a court's decision on one of these equitable motions is ripe for interlocutory review. 87 Moreover, immediate review is necessary to safeguard the movant's rights. Unlike postconviction review of 41(e) rulings, postconviction review of a denial of an equitable return motion is meaningless as it cannot protect the rights which a movant loses while the grand jury holds the evidence. 88 Thus, by changing her motion from one requesting return and suppression to one requesting simply return, a movant can ensure that she will be able to appeal immediately a court's refusal to return her property. 8 9 In this way, the availability of an equitable return motion solves many of the problems caused by the coupling of return and suppression under rule 41(e).9o CONCLUSION District court denial of preindictment motions made pursuant to rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should not be subject to interlocutory appeal. The final decision rule, which is strongest in the area of criminal law, prohibits this form of piecemeal review. Preindictment rulings on 41(e) motions fail to meet the Supreme Court's carefully crafted exceptions to the final decision rule. Furthermore, permitting immediate appeal of 41(e) rulings would cause pointless delay of the grand jury process. Because the availability of equitable relief eliminates any harm a movant may suffer from the retention of evidence by the grand jury, there is good reason to interpret the Supreme Court's holding in DiBella to prohibit interlocutory appeal of preindictment rulings on 41(e) motions.
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